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Time-Spaces of In/dependence and
Dis/ability
Michael Schillmeier
ABSTRACT. The article highlights the temporal construction of
everyday spaces that make up the societal relevance of in/depen-
dences and dis/abilities. Employing an account of empirical philo-
sophy, the article links self-conducted empirical research with
philosophical ideas. Introducing Heidegger’s notion of ‘time-space’,
the proposed view tries to avoid bifurcating in/dependences and
dis/abilities a priori as the effect of given realities. Rather, they
appear as highly fragile mediations of heterogeneous elements that
make up the times and spaces of emerging in/dependences and
dis/abilities. With special reference to ‘visual disability’, I explore
how ordinary acts of ‘dealing with money’ and ‘going shopping’
configure multiple ‘blind’ times and spaces of in/dependence 
and dis/ability. KEY WORDS blindness; dis/ability; mediation;
Heidegger; in/dependence; ready-to-hand; time-space
Introduction
For many people, the question concerning dependence and independence
(in/dependence) is vital for experiencing enabling and disabling scenarios
(dis/abilities) in the conduct of everyday life. This article highlights the tempo-
ral construction of everyday spaces that make up the societal relevance of
in/dependences and dis/abilities. The focus on ‘time’, though, cannot be accom-
plished by abstracting from ‘space’. Rather, employing a temporal conception
on in/dependence and dis/ability tries to stress the very practices of ‘time-
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spaces’ that bring into being the very specific ‘times’ and ‘spaces’ of in/depen-
dence and dis/ability in the first place. By doing so, the proposed view tries to
avoid bifurcating in/dependences and dis/abilities a priori as the effect given by
different abstract realities such as culture and nature, subject and object, indi-
vidual and society, human and non-human, etc.
I borrow the notion of ‘time-space’ from the German philosopher Martin
Heidegger. Heidegger’s ‘Zeit-Raum’ (Heidegger, 1994, 2000) marks the event
that neither refers to ‘time’ as a mere subjective construction nor ‘space’ as an
objective one. Moreover, the notion of Zeit-Raum cannot be thought of properly
as the mere effect of the succession of ‘nows’. Hence, Zeit-Räume shouldn’t be
conflated with Zeiträume, which are measured and countable spaces of time.
The relationship between Zeit-Räume and Zeiträume is that of ‘mediation’ and
‘intermediation’. An intermediary ‘transports meaning or force without trans-
formation’, whereas mediators ‘transform, translate, distort, and modify the
meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry’ (Latour, 2005: 39ff).
Clocks and chronographs are a good example to clarify this relation: clock-time
mediates time through the spatialization of time into periods, numbers, dis-
tances, etc. As clock-time ‘time’ comes into being through the very absence of
time, mere spatial relations define time. In effect, clocks and chronographs
become space-giving intermediaries of time. They give space to time as clock-
time measurable, calculable, traceable, exact, comparable, dividable, specifi-
able, etc. Clock-time, then, isn’t time but gives time, and in a very specific,
spatialized and embodied sense. Through clock-time we have and/or don’t have
time as seconds, minutes, hours and days wherever we are (Adam, 1995).
Obviously, clock-time time brings us closer to understanding time, especially
in modern times. However, clock-time doesn’t explain ‘the event’ Heidegger is
talking about; and neither is clock-time ‘time’ – except, as we have seen, as a
specific, globalized intermediary opening up the possibility of and maintaining
having modern times. To conflate ‘clock-time’ or ‘space of time’ with ‘time’ or
‘time-space’ refers to the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, as Alfred N.
Whitehead (1978) would say; it abstracts from the event of time itself. Rather,
the event refers to the time-space of mediation: ‘The event is the self establish-
ing [selbst ermittelnde] and mediating [vermittelnde] middle of Being’
(Heidegger, 1994: 75).1 The time-space of the event appropriates the openness
of the no longer and not yet: it appropriates the absence of presence of time-
space and its possible effects. Time-space means ‘temporalizing spacing – spac-
ing temporalization [Zeitigendes Räumen – räumende Zeitigung]’ (Heidegger,
1994: 261). The event, and this is Heidegger’s point, comes into being as appro-
priation [Ereignis] and disappropriation [Enteignis]. As an event, time-spaces
make time and space present and absent in the first place. Time-spaces mediate
time into space and space into time. It mediates the motility of time and space.
Time spatializes and space temporalizes.
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In such a reading, space and time are heterogeneous entities but as the effect
of time-spaces that mediate the durability as well as changeability of what is
thought of as temporal or spatial relations. Obviously, for Heidegger it was
important to describe the event of Being [Sein] in difference to beings
[Seiendes]. This article follows the event of beings (instead of Being) in differ-
ence to beings. To be sure, this is not the betrayal of the philosophy of the event
but its mediation. The latter unfolds what I like to call empirical philosophy.2
This brings me back to the time-spaces of in/dependence and dis/ability.
A temporal reading of in/dependence and dis/ability that focuses on time-
space, so my argument goes, leaves ontologically open what is to be understood
as ‘dis/ability’ or ‘in/dependence’. In/dependence and dis/ability cannot be
treated as fixed beings, but become an event of time-spaces that mediate their
multiple realities of in/dependences and dis/abilities instead. Rethinking in/
dependence and dis/ability through the event brings to the fore their being as a
‘contestable zone of controversy [strittiger Streitbezirk]’ (Heidegger, 1994:
260f). With this in mind, a ‘time-space’ reading of dis/ability and in/dependence
questions any attempt that splits up and mends dis/ability and in/dependence
into mere sources of different given realities in order to understand them. In con-
trast, this article will follow the traces of how in/dependences and dis/abilities
come into being through everyday practices. These practices elude an abstract
division of in/dependence and dis/ability into pure cultural or natural occasions
in time and space.
Obviously there is wide range of becoming in/dependent and dis/abled in
everyday life. With special reference to ‘visual disability’, I explore how ordi-
nary acts of everyday life configure ‘blind’ times and spaces of in/dependence
and dis/ability. Every becoming, as Moser and Law (1999) and Schillmeier
(2007a) argue, is specificity in its own right. Different (blind) people live
differently in different environments and have different lifestyles; they live
alone or with friends or family, they use different props for different reasons,
they have different preferences and repugnances, etc. In order to feel indepen-
dent and being able to do the necessary domestic routines without much distress,
bodies, technologies and things have to relate well. To be mobile outside their
homes, some blind people manage on their own whereas others depend heavily
on relatives and friends. To go out, some use assistive technologies like the
white cane or prefer a guide dog. Still, within the complex and highly variable
arrangements of societal life, these relations that allow independent living are
fragile tempo-material3 achievements and may easily turn into dependence and
disability (French, 1999; Michalko, 1999; Saerberg, 2007).
Consequently, one may say that when people feel independent or dependent it
is the contingent effect of highly specific material relations that have their own
rhythms and times, make up their socially relevant spatialities, assemble affects
and affectations, visualize (or alter) preferences and old habits, and so on. In
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effect, these relations are delicate achievements and are easily disturbed when
bodies, technologies and things do not assemble properly. They may turn good
(enabling) achievements into bad (disabling) ones (see Moser and Law, 1999).
These highly situated and heterogeneous human and non-human configurations
assemble the multiple times and spaces of dis/ability and in/dependence. For the
‘visually disabled’, dealing with money makes up some crucial scenarios for
defining their times and spaces of in/dependences and dis/abilities (Schillmeier,
2007a, 2007b).
Time/Space ‘Money’
Money functions as an intermediary that constantly relates the times and spaces
of the world along economic orders. Translating money into things and vice
versa, money and money technologies keep economic infrastructures circulating
and durable. Money also functions as a mediator – for good and for bad. First of
all, the circulation of money enacts the very relation between (calculating) sub-
jects and (calculated) objects. Calculating subjects and calculated objects are not
intrinsic features of humans and non-humans. Rather, it needs a third element
like money which opens up for the times and spaces of calculating subjects and
calculated objects: accelerated action and action at a distance (see Simmel,
1989, 1992). Moreover, money mediates the world into fetishes and facts,
luxury and debts, peace and war, love and hate, those who have money and those
who don’t, the rich and the poor, etc. Money creates banks and those who rob
them, and – according to Bert Brecht – it remains an open empirical question as
to what or who is the bigger delinquent.
At the same time, the fast circulation and distribution of money inscriptions
and money technologies mediates the enactment of visual relations that domi-
nate modern cultures (Simmel, 1997). With this in mind, the circulation of
money stabilizes modern visual cultures inasmuch as it relies on the visual read-
ability of money inscriptions (Schillmeier, 2007b, 2007c). Money and vision
keep modern subjects and objects and their spatio-temporal networks durable.
Money not only mediates material, social and moral inequalities, but also fabri-
cates sensory inequalities and in/dependence. In modern times we call it visual
disability.
Claire, 53 years old, glaucoma4
Money is so central to our society! And it is the practical day-to-day things like
money . . . it’s just too difficult because it is something we all have to do and there
is no way around it. It is depending on issues of trust when you are with your
friend, the person in the shop or whoever. Well, you know it is the vulnerability
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blind people feel when actually walking towards a cash point, particularly if they
have a white cane . . . I do not feel fine at one of those machines either, particular-
ly at night or in the evening, I tend to look around if somebody is there and you are
conscious if there is somebody behind you and if you can’t see you feel more
vulnerable . . . I think the whole issue of money is fraud . . . for me just knowing
which is a five-pound note and which is a ten-pound note and coins and things like
that. It is a very basic problem, you know, money is very difficult. It is impossible
to recognize and to differentiate what is what. It is about the size of the note, about
the feel of it and just generally because money is so important to everybody.
Elizabeth, 50 years old, totally blind 
Elizabeth explains how she pays with cash:
Beforehand I plan how much I will use. Well, I only use five and ten pound notes.
That’s how I manage it. If in the shop they, know you, they are usually very
friendly. They say that’s a ten pound note and I say ‘that’s a ten pound note yes, I
know’. I cannot tell the difference from the size. I use a plastic template to
measure. I fold them too, half and half again . . . You give a note and you get coins
as change and you are not sure what it is because there are a lot of people queuing
around you. People tend to push. It’s a vicious circle. I don’t want coins as change
but I always get it.
As we can see with Claire and Elizabeth, money not only mediates economic
exchange but also mediates social relations. Everyday money transactions
require more trust in others since the asymmetry of sensory perception origi-
nates the risk of fraud. Due to such sensory asymmetry, people become more
vulnerable especially in public spaces. They invite muggers and thieves; the
more so if assistant technologies like the white cane symbolizes that the person
is blind. Not only do social relations change, but money itself does. It translates
from money of and for the sighted to money of and for the blind. However, as
we can see, visually attuned money doesn’t translate easily into ‘blind’ money.
Currencies differ in their materiality. Money mediates into different materiali-
ties (coins, paper money, plastic cards, electronic money, etc.); they also have
different colours, shapes, textures, weights, thickness and sizes. To become
blind money, different temporal and spatial arrangements have to be mobilized.
Blind money practices slow down and lengthen money transactions; blind
people plan, select and earmark the money in use. Assistive technologies like
templates function as intermediaries to make them translate into blind money.
Generally speaking, it is the assemblage of human and non-human configura-
tions enacting blind times and spaces that disrupt, question and alter the pres-
ence of visually enacted times and spaces. These configurations also mediate the
intermediary ‘money’ itself; visual money becomes blind money. Such a clash
of different regimes of time and space disables when no translation, when no
mediation, is possible. Through failed money transactions, blind people become
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disabled. They become visible as blind in visual relations. In that moment, blind
people are caught in the event of the no longer and not yet. Money, then, is no
longer visual money and not yet blind money. It remains as disabling everyday
life.
Rose, 73 years old, age-related macular degeneration
I prefer cash, it is better for me. I feel more secure with cash and it allows you a
more normal life. That’s why I prefer cash. If you didn’t have cash you have to
leave it to somebody else. I need to feel to be a little independent with the money,
you know. When I pay, when I go with my daughter shopping I pay myself. I tell
her what I want. She takes me to the counter and I pick up my stuff and pay myself.
I feel independent and I’ve got my own money to pay it. You know, the bills come
in and I can’t see them. I have to leave all that to my daughter to sign it. It’s direct
debit. All those big bills. But the ordinary everyday things in life I like to be
independent. Or, if I want to pay something. You know, if somebody comes for a
collection or something. I can’t bring my card out and say right I give you fifty
pence by card for The Big Issue or something. You know if you live on your own
as I do you’ve got to be independent. There is no way just to rely on other people.
You’ve got try it yourself.
Rose wants to be able to manage money on her own. As we said earlier, handling
money is an act that defines calculative subjects and creates a highly specific set
of dependent independences as Simmel (1989) has pointed out so well.5 The
proper use of money makes her feel like a self-acting, calculating and discre-
tionary subject who is able to deal with calculable objects. This is precisely what
money relations achieve and necessitate: split subjects and objects. If Rose
cannot deal with money, she doesn’t feel like a discretionary subject and she
appears disabled. Rose, as well as Elizabeth, cannot use ‘money’ in general.
Rose’s economic transactions are rather limited to those involving ‘cash’: she
does not deal well with credit cards or with bills. It is her daughter, she says, who
takes care of bills. For Rose this does not seem to be extremely problematic as
long as she can still be in control of everyday tasks involving money: the super-
market, somebody knocking on the door for a collection, etc. In these situations
it is important for her to manage and pay ‘with her own money’, which, in order
to become hers, has to have a material specificity. Cards don’t work to pay at the
door and bills have to be paid by direct debit signed by her daughter. Big notes
are difficult as well since Rose, like many blind people, cannot check the change
properly (given the short period of time, they feel vulnerable or an obstacle for
others and so on). Blind people can never be sure what they get back; and it is
precisely money that has been able to measure precisely what to get back!
Accordingly, Rose’s independence is mediated through several dependencies.
For her, to manage on her own does not mean to do everything alone. She
doesn’t mind that her daughter signs big bills since this is the best option any-
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way. She is fine with her daughter walking her around, picking up the products
she has asked for, and bringing her and the products chosen to the counter. But
once there, she wants to pay on her own. For Rose, the very act of paying at the
supermarket’s counter defines the agency of paying and excludes all those who
have contributed to make her shopping not an individual but collective achieve-
ment. Rather, it individualizes Rose’s independence. It does not matter that the
daughter has helped her continuously and has done all the physical actions of her
shopping. The ability to pay marks the whole action as her own – then she feels
independent and she is paying ‘on her own’.
All those specificities described, so my argument goes, come into being as the
effect of the event when money for the sighted translates (or doesn’t) into money
for the blind. A first result of my investigation, I like to stress that it is the very
time-space mediation of a third element like money that opens up for the possi-
bilities of highly specific times and spaces of dis/abilities and in/dependences.
We could see how dependencies fabricate independences. Collective dependen-
cies on others – human and non-human alike – configure independent action and
abilities. Obviously, collective dependencies may also lure into dependencies
and disabilities.
It became very clear that money transactions are dominated by visually regu-
lated rules and routines. As an event, blind practices disrupt, alter and change
these practices dramatically. Money practices slow down so significantly that
blind people become present as different. Blind practices also visualize the
hidden structures of visual everyday money practices, which have been defining
the spatial situation as well as the temporalities of action involved. The different
materialities, sizes, textures, shapes, weights of the different currencies also play
a crucial role in visualizing sensory differences and their temporalities mediat-
ing in/dependences and dis/abilities. Furthermore, money appears as a most
relevant intermediary in our everyday life – we cannot live without money;
‘money is so central to our society’, as Claire said. Indeed, money rules the
world. It also mediates the world into highly specific relations and entities: value
calculating subjects and calculable objects with value. This is why independent
money management plays a dominating role for the blind. As I have shown pre-
viously, such independence is very much an effect of mediated dependencies.
Value objects as money that seem to be endlessly translatable into other things
are risky objects since everybody wants to have them. And we have seen that it
is much easier to have money, to be with money and to deal with being sighted
than being blind.
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Standing Alone: Shopping Experiences and the Simultaneity of 
Non-Simultaneous Times and Spaces
Mary, 62 years old, age-related macular degeneration
The great difficulty is to stand alone. We are going to the supermarket and they
have the habit of moving things.
We all sometimes get lost or stuck when we encounter unknown situations. For
the blind, living in hegemonic, modern visual infrastructures, this is a much
more recurring experience than it is for the majority of sighted others. Mary
hints at a typical situation where and why she gets stuck: people in the super-
market tend to move things. Indeed, supermarket strategies tend to change the
order of their products from time to time, so as to induce customers to explore
the shop and go to areas they normally would not visit. This is meant to make
people buy more and different things. For Mary, those strategies appear highly
problematic: she does not find the things she was thinking of buying nor does
she find possible new products. At that moment, the presence of the supermarket
does not translate into the possibility of proper shopping; Mary gets stuck and
the displacement of things makes her feel displaced as well.
As we can see, being able to move around and to find one’s way involves the
synchronicity of memorized spaces and sensed spaces. When Mary finds and
identifies the product she intends to buy, the different spaces (memorized and
sensed spaces) are simultaneously present and appear as one space where multi-
ple spaces are synchronizing. Memorized and sensed spaces translate into each
other; they are time-space, so to speak. But when her memorized space does not
connect with the sensed space or vice versa, the lack of synchronicity leaves her
stuck in a present past, a future present and a present future. Again, we can see
what it means to be caught in the event of the no longer and not yet. Stuck and
standing alone, the supermarket’s time-spaces are not part of her knowledge
anymore. She becomes a stranger in her normal everydayness.
With Heidegger (1993), one can say that the present memorized spatiality
ready-to-hand [Zuhanden] (usable and accessible space, where things are
known and work) does not translate into the readiness-to-hand of sensed spatial-
ities. Ready-to-hand things assemble Mary’s ‘blindness’ and allow her to feel
independent and enable her to move around and do her everyday routines.
Present-at-hand [Vorhanden], the time-spaces of the supermarket turn into
detached arrangements lying somewhere outside her ready-to-hand memorized
knowledge. They make up mere present-at-hand spatialities alienating what is
ready-to-hand in her memorized space. Subsequently, the presence of the
products she wants to buy appears utterly absent; Mary is caught up in present
space full of disconnected and unknown objects. The presence of these absent
object-spaces makes her stuck in the past. She cannot connect to the ready-to-
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hand of present space. The non-synchronicity of memorized and sensed spaces
visualizes Mary’s blindness as highly disabling. Left in the past, she stands
alone in the present, feels rather bad and becomes completely dependent on
sighted others. She experiences the no longer and not yet.
Simmel (1997) has already pointed out the different social times and spaces
that emerge depending on different sensory practices. He argues that the ‘socio-
logical mood’ of the blind differs from the deaf and the way both – deaf and
blind people – relate to the hegemony of visual practices and infrastructures (see
also Ree, 1999). For ‘the blind person, the other person exists only in succes-
sion, in the temporal succession of their utterances’. The ‘restless, disturbing
simultaneity’ of past and present relations as ‘it lies revealed in the faces of
people elude the blind person’ (Simmel, 1997: 114). The blind, according to
Simmel’s argument, can detach from the ephemeral modern ways of seeing and
being seen, because they can withdraw from the natures/cultures of visual rela-
tions, whereas the deaf are exposed to them. The blind person lives primarily in
non-simultaneous times and spaces which, according to Simmel (1997), ‘may be
the reason for the peaceful and calm mood, the uniform friendliness towards the
surroundings, which is so often observed among the blind’ (p. 114). The deaf,
the one who sees without hearing, ‘is generally much more confused, helpless
and disturbed than the one who hears without being able to see’ (p. 114). This is
partly compensated by the different modes of memorizing through hearing or
seeing. We recall better what we have heard than what we have seen, ‘despite
the fact that what a person has said is irredeemable as such, whereas a person
presents themselves to the eye as a relatively stable object’ (Simmel, 1997: 114).
The impression one could get is that Simmel simplifies and romanticizes
blind practices inasmuch as it is only the ‘nature’ of vision that allows for the
vibrating simultaneity, whereas the blind person remains in the haven of
tranquillity given by the non-simultaneous world. The blind appear as the old-
fogyish, non-modern counterpart to the velocity of modern (visual) life.
However, I think that Simmel’s sociological account of the senses shows that
different sensory practices mediate different social practices. As we have seen
earlier with Elizabeth, Rose and Mary, it seems rather difficult to make any
general claims about fixed sources that make visually disabled people ‘blind’,
since it is very much a question of how different ‘blind’ times and spaces come
into being through a multiplicity of mediators. In such a reading, Simmel points
very precisely to the issue at stake in this article. It is the co-presence of differ-
ent sensory and memorizing practices, different temporal practices and the
emergence of simultaneous and non-simultaneous spaces that mediate the open-
ness of the human social (Simmel, 1919).
This point is relevant to understanding how Mary needs to sense and access
the supermarket’s times and spaces when she is faced with the incompatibility
between her memory of things and her actual sensory practices of them. The
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permanence of things is granted much more by the mediation of sight than by the
other senses. Sighted people are thought to live in the presence of things and
persons. To be sure, they also rely on memorized spaces and make the presence
visible as a ‘seen’ practice. The actualization of the present time and space,
however, can be done in a much faster and independent way (for instance, by
‘having a look around’ in the supermarket). Blind practices on the contrary are
much more dependent to construct the present through the passage from the past
into the future. Blind people, more than sighted people in visual culture, are
constantly moved by the possibility of events that change the known into the
unknown. Accordingly, blind people have to relate more closely to the absent,
the non-present and, indeed, to the invisible. The actualization of past into pre-
sent is not a process that is smooth and fast – as the ‘stop and go’ or ‘zigzagging’
movements of blind people show. Such movements visualize the hard work of
constant translation between memorized and sensed/perceived spaces that medi-
ate the emergent time-spaces into new times and spaces as they come into being
while sensing and perceiving. Blind practices slow down the temporalities of
visual practices and visualize what remains invisible for these visual relations.
Most importantly, blind practices show very explicitly that we do not deal
simply with the presence of things. Rather, the past and the future have to be
translated in multiple ways (depending on, for instance, the different sensory
practices involved) into the presence of human practices. They are constantly in
touch with the event of the no longer and not yet; it appropriates the absence of
presence.
Blindness unravels the presence of memorized space in our daily, visually
attuned practices. With this in mind, the past does not refer to the things that
happened in the past, as if they were fixed in a self-contained and isolated space
that has been left behind. Rather, the past appears where it is not supposed to be:
in the present. Blind practices bring to the fore how the past translates into and
interferes actively with the present. In this way, blindness discloses the weaving
of different pasts (as well as futures), which normally remain hidden within the
tempo-spatialities of taken-for-granted visual infrastructures. Blind practices
reveal the disruption of the linearity of the flow of things, i.e. from the past into
the present and future. Enacted by the known6 past and the unknown future, the
very act of walking blindly unravels that we always go backwards and forwards
in time. We constantly mediate different times and spaces. One can say that the
very process of becoming blind ‘complexifies’ the visual times and spaces in
place. It not only makes present the normativity of the ‘structural silence’
(Seremetakis, 1994) of sighted times and spaces, it also draws attention to the
becoming of highly idiosyncratic but mixed times and spaces that synchronize
or do not synchronize with other times and spaces.
Blind practices are a good example to question and alter the ‘presentism’
(Assmann, 2002: 400) of common social constructivism where the past and
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future are mere effects of the present. In our case (where Mary is standing
alone), both the past and the future enact the present through the mediation of
past and future things. The supermarket’s past arrangements come into a present
which, for Mary, belongs to the future. These multiple temporal belongings
challenge our common (modern) understanding of presence as a mode of non-
simultaneous and simultaneous ‘nows’ (presentism). Rather, they draw our
attention to the power of highly individual, relational effects of time-spaces,
which maintain or disrupt, question and alter, the temporalities and spatialities
of societal orderings in place.
It also challenges the classical reading of subject–object relations. The things
with which we deal in our everyday lives are not mere objects that subjects
perceive. Rather, they contribute to the enabling or disabling times and spaces in
the conduct of everyday practices. In Mary’s case, they emerge as uncertain and
vague times and spaces of past and future objects. Caught in the event, the non-
accessible presence of things enacts times and spaces of dependencies that are
highly disabling. Hence, it is not about the given subjectivity of sensing or
perceiving the objectivity of things. Rather, it is about the mediation of hetero-
geneous times and spaces that make up human and non-human configurations.
It visualizes the compatibility without comparability of time and space as it
becomes apparent through the event (time-space):
Each extends the other, but only from the other’s position. What the extensions
yield are different capacities. In this view, there is no subject–object relation
between a person and a tool, only an expanded or realized capability. (Strathern,
1991: 38)
Mary’s times and spaces do not synchronize with the times and spaces of the
marketing strategies given by the supermarket. Different times and spaces
emerge from ‘a difference-driven process by which the given is given’ (De
Landa, 1999: 31). As Gilles Deleuze (2001) argues:
Diversity is given but difference is that by which the given is given . . . Every
phenomenon refers to an inequality by which it is conditioned . . . Everything
which happens and everything which appears is correlated with orders of differ-
ences. (p. 222)
Mary’s story shows the interference of such different temporalities and spatiali-
ties. These different realities do not fuse into one, but remain two that are co-
present to each other. All of these different times and spaces are real – blind and
sighted, actual and virtual alike.7 They materialize into Mary’s ‘blindness’ and
the supermarket’s ‘sightedness’. Not only do they co-exist, they become present
on their own terms; that is, they are self-referential practices of visual and blind
time-spaces. Thus, we have rather complex assemblages of times and spaces that
make different times and spaces relate and not relate. To be sure, when things
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are moved in the supermarket, blind as well as sighted people are somehow
alienated from the possibility to shop; but, and this is the point, they are affected
differently. The supermarket moves things for the sighted and not for Mary!
In effect, Mary stands alone and the supermarket sells nothing. She endangers
the supermarket’s strategies. Just as the blind beggar who is holding out for
money threatens capitalism, so Mary threatens the supermarket’s policy when
she gets stuck. Moreover, being stuck enacts Mary’s disability as a highly visual
one and creates the dependence on the sighted. At the same time, the situation
actualizes the capacities and skills of ‘normal’ sighted customers who may have
a look around and will (potentially) buy more things.
When Mary gets stuck, she uses specific techniques to overcome her ‘blind-
ness’:
I stop anybody to ask and I am saying: ‘Are you staff?’ And they mostly say: ‘No
love, we are customers’. But I ask anyway: ‘Can you tell me what’s on that packet?
Can you tell me the cooking instruction and can you tell me the expiring date?’ and
all that sort of thing. By that you keep your independence and you are . . . it is
better than sitting down and doing nothing . . . I have a good husband; without him
I’d be useless, absolutely useless . . . [The white cane] is your best friend, you
know? It is a walking stick, a courtesy cane. If you carry a cane people will move
away from you. I could not go outdoors without it. We are mates. Without the cane
it would be very difficult . . . 
When stuck, one of her strategies is to enrol others, to make them act with and/or
for her. So she tries to synchronize the different visual and blind times and
spaces. The husband appears to be very useful in mediating such mixed situa-
tions as well. Without her husband’s mediation she often feels ‘absolutely use-
less’. In addition, relations with technologies mediate as well: the white cane
allows her to keep moving outdoors,8 to keep the right distance to others by
triggering off courtesy rules. An assistive technology like the cane turns into a
‘courtesy cane’, a ‘mate’ that – like her husband – mediates and synchronizes
mixed situations and their differing orderings.
Thus, humans and non-humans alike become best friends in mediating her
into independences and abilities. Again, we can see that there is not a given
source that affects in/dependence and dis/ability. Rather, it is the very process of
mediation that enables her to do things and move around.9 Mary extends her
ready-to-hand embodied practices to heterogeneous others. Thus, the very abil-
ity or disability to do things is not a question of independency or dependency.
Rather, dis/abilities are effects of heterogeneous relations that actualize depen-
dencies on heterogeneous others.
With this in mind, independences and abilities refer to enabling relations
‘without having to look’ (Heidegger, 1993: 69). As argued previously, these
assemblages unfold the readiness-to-hand of things. According to Heidegger,
the associations [Umgang] with ready-to-hand relations are, metaphorically
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speaking, not ‘blind’. Rather, they configure the secure and cautious pragmatics
of ‘care’ [Umsicht] that network heterogeneous entities into fitting ones.10
Ready-to-hand, mind, bodies, technologies and objects assemble the ‘handi-net-
work’ [Werk] of everyday life. Ready-to-hand, the handi-net-work of things
reveals its own ‘nature/culture’ [Umweltnatur] by mediating humans and non-
humans in highly specific and self-limiting11 ways. Moreover, the nature/culture
of handi-net-work allows the eventfulness of mediators to become invisible;
mediators become intermediaries. By making blind practices work, handi-net-
works affirm the normativity of blind practices through which ‘blind indepen-
dence’ and ‘blind ability’ are possible. Read-to-hand, these handi-net-works
turn invisible; they become black-boxed. This means that ready-to-hand minds,
bodies, technologies and objects appear as accessible and connectable in order
to live blindness without getting stuck in other practices that enact, or are
enacted in, other natures/cultures.
When present-at-hand [Vorhanden] relations and things are disabling the
readiness-to-hand of blind practices, it brings to the fore the conspicuousness of
the event. Non-conspicuous times and spaces of blind handi-net-works mediate
into the conspicuousness and normativity of non-blind times and spaces. This
means that minds, bodies, technologies and objects may be present but remain
absent for the specific normativity of blind handinet-works: they provoke
dependencies and disabilities given by the normativity of non-blind (e.g.
visually attuned) natures/cultures instead.
Conclusion
We have seen how conflicting normativities mediate between the readiness-to-
hand or presence-at-hand of things and practices. If associations are badly put
together, disconnected or displaced from ready-to-hand situations, the very
rhythms, the temporalities and spatialities involved are disrupted, questioned
and altered. Estranged, humans and non-humans alike become merely present-
at-hand. This means, although dependent on each other, humans and non-
humans don’t ‘understand’ each other. They become disabled and dependent
entities due to the relations involved: bodies cannot move, courtesy rules are
broken, white canes and guide dogs become problematic tools that symbolize
blindness, money cannot be read properly as money which won’t allow payment
to be made, objects become obstacles to run against, minds are not able to think
and the senses are unable to feel or decide what is felt.
Such a Heideggerian reading of ordinary acts has tremendous effects on how
to approach the issues of dependence or independence and disability or ability.
‘Being’ dependent or independent and disabled or abled is not given by nature
as some(-)thing present-at-hand. Rather, in/dependences and dis/abilities turn
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into a multiple becoming of ready-to-hand and/or present-at-hand times and
spaces of human and non-human configurations. Thus, dis/abling practices are
fragile passages between the readiness-to-hand and the presence-at-hand of
things and practices. They do not refer to mere present-at-hand sources given by
mental, sensory or bodily skills on one hand and the properties of objects and
technologies on the other. Rather, skills and properties are nothing but modes of
mediation that unfold the possibilities of in/dependence and dis/ability. This is
precisely what the parlance of the eventfulness of time-spaces is adamant about.
The time-space as the event of ‘temporalizing spacing – spacing temporaliza-
tion’ makes us aware that there is no such thing as dependence or independence,
ability or disability. Rather, we encounter the constant movement between the
readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand of contingent human/non-human
objects and relations that articulate (and black-box) the associations of reference
of human sociation in everyday life. Enabling relations may easily turn into dis-
abling relationships that again may turn into enabling relations. Such a reading
takes the heterogeneous and multiple becomings of human sociation into con-
sideration and ‘free[s] us from the dogma that the human sociation which we
know is a completely self-evident one’ (Simmel, 1997: 114). It brings to the fore
the eventfulness of human association and how the normativity of societal order-
ings (e.g. sighted and blind people) is maintained or questioned and altered.
Following the concept of time-space, readiness-to-hand relations are pri-
mordial to present-at-hand relationships (Heidegger, 1993). With it, Heidegger
affirms the different times and spaces of beings by the very process of affirma-
tion of time-space itself: times and spaces are the effects of temporalizing spac-
ing and spacing temporalization. Every being is already and always related
ready-to-hand to others. Ready-to-hand with others, the event of time-space
makes beings become visible (present) to others and invisible (non-present) to
themselves. The question, then, of what being is, is not a question of being but a
question of the event of associating the different modes of existence
(present/absent) that make up the conditions of possibility of being in the first
place. By rethinking in/dependence and dis/ability as events, we enter the ques-
tion of how in/dependence and dis/ability comes into being. Such an interest in
the temporality of beings has to be empirical since temporality values the
empirical as the only ‘contestable zone of controversy’ [strittiger Streitbezirk]
of beings.
I think an empirical philosophy of time-spaces, as briefly outlined earlier,
offers a methodological alternative to traditional disciplinary research that takes
either ‘the social’, or ‘the individual’, ‘the environment’ or ‘nature’, as the sole
explanatory power of making the world present. Rather, if we take temporality
seriously, those abstract formulas of ordering are disrupted, questioned and
altered by the concrete practices of everyday life. Heidegger’s philosophy of the
event affirms the everyday life of such heterogeneous entities as people and
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things and their properties [Eigentum] by how, when and where they (dis)asso-
ciate each other. Such properties, for instance, make present ‘blind’ or ‘sighted’
practices but, as we have seen previously, only through the other and with other
mediators (e.g. money). Mediated properties are too empirical, too diffuse, too
messy, too individual, and too complex to be fully explained by an abstract force
like, for example, ‘nature’, ‘culture’ or ‘the social’. Rather, mediated properties
object global views of them precisely because they draw people and things
together into the ‘contestable zone of controversy’ of everyday human affairs.
Notes
1. ‘Das Ereignis ist die sich selbst ermittelnde und vermittelnde Mitte, in die alle
Wesung der Wahrheit des Seyns im voraus zurückgedacht werden muß.’
2. See Heidegger (1994: 388).
3. On the social relevance of time and its intrinsic relation with the material world, see
the work of Barbara Adam (2004a, 2004b).
4. The article draws on qualitative empirical work conducted in the north-west of
England (1997–2000). The fieldwork included semi-structured and narrative inter-
views with 30 blind people (aged from 25 to 90 years). Many of the blind people
interviewed were not totally blind; their sight varied from seeing some colours or a
small amount of light to seeing only rough edges, black spots and so forth. Only a
small number of people were totally blind. Obviously, it also makes a difference if
people are congenitally ‘blind’ or became blind later in life. But this is just one of
many specificities that make up the complexities of people’s blindness. At this point,
I wish to thank all the blind people I have met during my fieldwork.
5. Let us not forget that children are slowly introduced to money, and it takes them a
while to obtain permission from proper calculative agents to use it on their own and
without surveillance. Elderly people have difficulties again in dealing with the time-
spaces of how currencies are used.
6. The past also becomes unknown by forgetting. It can affect good and bad passages
as well. It may give time and space for the ‘future’ but it may estrange people from
the ‘presence’ of the world (as it is the case with dementia).
7. With Mary, the virtual past and future are real. ‘The virtual is fully real in so far as it
is virtual . . . The actualisation of the virtual . . . always takes place by difference,
divergence or differentiation. Actualisation breaks with resemblance as a process no
less than it does with identity as a principle. Actual terms never resemble the singu-
larities they incarnate. In this sense, actualisation or differentiation is always genuine
creation’ (Deleuze, 2001: 208–212). See also Bergson (1948, 1991, 1998).
8. Obviously, the white cane does not work for all visually disabled people. For many
of them, the white cane makes them feel independent and symbolizes or visualizes
their disability in the first place. For others the white cane is an ‘invitation to
muggers’ (see Schillmeier, 2007b, 2007c). I will discuss this point later in the article.
9. On mediation, see Callon (1986, 1991, 1998) and Latour (1986, 1994, 2005).
10. Heidegger uses ‘sightedness’ and ‘blindness’ as metaphors for practices that enable
or disable. Obviously, it is not about the everyday practices of blindness at all, since
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they can be – in Heidegger’s parlance – ‘sighted’ and ‘blind’. Hence, in order to
address the very enabling and disabling practices of blind people I will use the con-
ceptual division between ready-to-hand and present-at-hand to avoid any misread-
ing.
11. These limits are not fixed boundaries. They are constantly changing, as does the
related ‘Umweltnatur’.
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